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Chapter 7 draws on Erikson’s writings from 1964. He begins by stating that the nuclear age should involve women at the highest levels of decision-making since, as mothers, they have the future of their children at stake. Erikson believes women in positions of public leadership would add an “ethically restraining” power to politics (261). He says too much of the freedom women have won lies in access to career competition and consumership. Equality has “not led to equivalence, and equal rights have by no means secured equal representation” (262) when one considers that women’s deepest concerns are not expressed in terms of their public influence.
Erikson finds a dilemma in the way that men who try to help define the “uniqueness of womanhood” (262) are criticized, yet many women find it hard to speak about their deepest feelings without sounding defiant or apologetic. The author believes men wish to preserve the differences between the sexes, including male dominance, and that when that dominance is threatened, men cannot be fair.
The author next turns to the “problem” of the identity of female youth. He begins by assuming that young women successfully pass from youth to maturity when they leave the parental family to commit to a mate and their children. Their identity formation differs from that of young men because of their capacity to bear and care for children. He finds this the “core problem” of the crisis assigned to Stage 5, that of fidelity.
Looking at female patients who found themselves conflicted about their womanhood and the “permanent inequality to which it seemed to doom them” (265), he acknowledges that most clinical observation has been done by men. He dismisses the Freudian idea that a girl’s early discovery that she lacks a penis causes trauma, and instead, he posits that through observation of other women, girls discover that they have the ability to bear children.
Erikson describes his participation in a long-term study of boys and girls between 10 and 12 years old conducted at the University of California. The preteens were given the task of constructing an exciting scene from an imaginary movie using toys such as a family, uniformed figures, animals, cars, and blocks. Erikson observed that boys and girls used space differently, the boys emphasizing outer space, and the girls, inner space. For instance, the girls might build the interior of a house and place people and animals within them. Boys constructed houses with elaborate walls, protrusions, and towers and placed people and animals outside them, often utilizing police officers in their scenes.
Erikson offers two simple explanations for the differences in the scenes between boys and girls. They might have represented the presence in the male of an external organ, and in the female, internal ones. They might also have represented a boy’s traditional love of the outdoors, and a girl’s, the indoors. He then offers a more inclusive interpretation, proposing that the way in which the body is constructed—with a penis or a vagina—predisposes the way the young person arranges space. Erikson relates this theory to male tendencies to dominate human space in the realms of height, speed, and collision and female tendencies to center their identities in their childbearing capacity.
Since this interpretation breaks from Freudian tradition, Erikson explains the characteristics of a post-Freudian position on the development of the ego. The complexes and conflicts first attributed to human nature by psychoanalysis are “recognized as existing” but the “wholeness of experience and the opportunities arising with a resolved crisis” (276) can transcend trauma. In other words, the post-Freudian position—Erikson’s own—acknowledges the role of positive outside forces to resolve psychological issues.
Returning to the subject of the importance of the “inner space” in the development of young women, Erikson theorizes that emptiness is the center of both despair and fulfillment for women. A woman abandoned by a man, mourning a child, or experiencing menopause feels empty. He finds it a uniquely male interpretation that women desire a penis. Instead, he suggests that “procreative patterns” are at the root of all inspiration and, if integrated, give power to “all experience and to its communication” (278). The possession of an inner space will always affect women’s development, whether or not they build their life around their ability to have children. Erikson believes this explains why female infants are more likely to survive birth than male ones, why girls can focus on details earlier than boys can, and why women have a longer life expectancy.
The author also believes that women are biologically predisposed to react to the needs of others and show less resistance to control and impulsiveness in adolescence than young men. While he believes men, especially creative ones, have some feminine qualities, women’s qualities exist for the sake of survival of the species.
Adolescent women, like men, experience the “psychosocial moratorium” that delays the onset of adult functioning until they have had a chance to try different experiences. This may include venturing into traditionally male identities. They often ask if they can have an identity before they know “whom they will marry and for whom they will make a home” (282). Erikson believes that a young woman’s identity will always assume there is some man “to be joined and […] children to be brought up” (282). He links much of her identity to her brand of attractiveness and search for a man. At the same time, he acknowledges that young women can take part in many activities that are removed from the future job of childbearing. Still, their moratorium must end in selecting what will be admitted to the inner space “for keeps” (that is, a husband).
Erikson believes that throughout history, women have allowed themselves to be exploited by men: “confined and immobilized, enslaved and infantilized, prostituted and exploited” (284). He believes that anatomy is destiny (a saying popularized by Freud) in determining both physical functions and personality, but he acknowledges that people are more than their bodies. They have individual personalities and are defined by group memberships. Drawing on a statement of Napoleon’s that “history is destiny” (285), he concludes that anatomy, history, and personality combine to determine the individual.
Erikson raises the question whether any one field can provide data on which valid conclusions about the differences between the sexes can be made. Humans exist on multiple levels, which Erikson calls Soma (humans are organisms living a life cycle), Psyche (the realm in which ego is the organizing principle), and Polis (citizenship). In the Soma sphere, women do not only exist as child-bearers but as citizens, workers, and individuals. Within Psyche, women have a unique feminine identity requiring further study. In Polis, women have the capacity for work and leadership, yet their child-bearing abilities will require some adaptations.
Soma, Psyche, and Polis can be integrated for women, but not without some conflict. Women’s ability to procreate does not “doom” them to perpetual motherhood and deny their identity and equality. Women can match men’s competence in most areas. However, their reproductive capacity must be reckoned with in regard to their long-term goals. He concludes that women’s vision and creativity may yet lead to new advances in the sciences—advances that are much-needed, given that the men who have dominated science have led humanity to the brink of extinction.
Chapter 8 draws on Erikson’s writings from 1966. Erikson begins by noting the pervasiveness of the term “identity” in the literature on the “Negro revolution” in the country (known today as the civil rights movement). He finds the term in other countries as well where people of color revolt against colonial traditions. Erikson wishes to restate some of the dimensions of the issue of identity and relate them to the “sudden emergence of national awareness of the position” of Black people in the United States (295).
He quotes African American writers, including Ralph Ellison (Invisible Man, 1952) and James Baldwin (Nobody Knows My Name, 1961), who stress negative identity elements in their writing. Ellison and Baldwin gave some of their key works titles suggesting invisibility and namelessness. Erikson interprets this preoccupation with negative identity as a demand to be “heard and seen” and recognized as “individuals with a choice” (297) rather than people defined by their skin color.
Erikson sees the preoccupation with identity as a corrective trend in history, one in which writers from underrepresented groups become spokespeople for a painful identity confusion as a moral decision. Giving Nazi Germany’s demonization of Jews as an example, Erikson uses the term “pseudospecies” for an artificial identity forced upon a group by others who consider themselves elites. Technological sophistication seems to escalate the problem.
Erikson looks more closely at the concept of identity-consciousness with regard to the role of African Americans in the civil rights movement. He finds that the young people who participated in the movement so immersed themselves in it that they defined a generation. Still, identity cannot be completely immersed in a communal identity, or the individual would be completely at the mercy of history.
The author posits that African American mothers were afraid to push their children toward academics to keep them safe from being perceived as competitive. He refers to this as cultivating a “surrendered identity” (302) of the type forced on African American men for generations.
All people have both positive and negative elements in their psychosocial identity. Negative elements result from negative prototypes in one’s upbringing—for instance, no Jewish person wants to be perceived as a “schlemihl” (also spelled schlemiel, Yiddish for a fool). Those who belong to minority groups that are prevented from emulating dominant cultural ideals “fuse” the negative images forced upon them by the dominant group with their own group’s negative identity prototypes.
It is the task of a “remorseful” majority to watch for and rout out hidden prejudices. Those who want to assess or categorize the minority group must do the same. He quotes the social psychologist Thomas Pettigrew, for example, who points out that the typical intelligence test is meant to test middle-class white people. Erikson observes that such tests also fail to rate positive qualities such as humor, music, spirituality, and athletic ability.
Identity development occurs across “two kinds of time” (308): as a developmental stage in a person’s life, and as a period in history. Personal history and collective history develop in a mutual relationship. Young people who successfully pass through the youth life cycle often benefit from immersion in a positive ideological trend associated with new technical and economic expansion. He gives as examples mercantilism, colonialism, and industrialization. Young people, including Black youth, must have access to these trends while also being able to retain the cultural customs that also define their identity.
Erikson wonders if the rise of Malcolm X and Black Muslimism, which he attributes to the rage that is aroused when identity development is stunted, represents a sort of totalitarianism. He proposes an alternative in a “more inclusive identity” (313) for Black Americans. Again recalling that personal and collective history go hand in hand, he sees the need for more inclusive identities in many parts of the world, especially countries overcoming a “tribal, feudal, or colonial” past (315). He believes the previously dominant groups and those reaching for a new identity must join their identities for this to happen.
In particular, opportunities to obtain technical skill must be open to everyone. Erikson also offers identities with Africans and with the middle class as choices for African Americans. However, to fully join the middle class means that barriers of real estate and consumerism must be removed. Perhaps the greatest gain in positive identity offered to African Americans is “prosocial action,” that is, nonviolent protest. He believes all youth who strive to be humanists, including with regard to race relations, must consider ethical concerns of a kind that were once in the religious sphere.
The author wonders how to predict the worldwide fate of postcolonial identities in light of new national interests in Africa and Asia. In Vietnam, in particular, he frames American support for South Vietnam against the Viet Cong as that of a colonial force trying to dominate an Indigenous group.
Erikson closes the essay collection by pointing out that the essays arose from workshop symposia in which he was contributing a dimension of an issue, not a conclusion. He points out that since psychoanalysis is related to history, and history is always changing, a concept such as “identity” is also bound to change.
Though he rejects some of Freud’s most famously misogynistic theories—most notably the concept of “penis envy”—Erikson himself has been criticized for having an “androcentric” (male-centered) gender bias. Some of the content of Chapter 7, where he seems to stress traditional and stereotypical gender roles for women as wives and mothers, may help to explain this criticism.
Erikson breaks from Freud in proposing that a consciousness of the womb and the capacity to bear children is important to young women’s development. Contra Freud, Erikson posits that young women do not see themselves as deprived of a penis but as gifted with something equally if not more valuable. Yet in proposing this theory, Erikson gives credence to a gender essentialism that views womanhood as synonymous with potential motherhood. When he argues that women have “found their identities” in their bodies and thus “taken it for granted” that the outer world belongs to men (274), he is restating a patriarchal ideology with its roots in the “angel in the home” mythology of the Victorian era. By treating the bodily organs of the vagina and uterus as metaphors for the proper sphere of women’s lives—interior, domestic—Erikson repeats the same mistake he accuses Freud of making. His analysis of Psychosocial Development and the Mutual Contract among women and girls assumes that all women desire—or should desire—to one day marry and have children. For Erikson, their very identity is linked to their attractiveness and search for a man.
These ideas shape Erikson’s understanding of the feminist movement and his use of Psychoanalysis as Social and Political Critique. Erikson aligns with second-wave feminists in his declaration that legal equality for women has “not led to equivalence, and equal rights have by no means secured equal representation” (262). In arguing for greater political power for women, however, he relies on notions of women as naturally compassionate and nurturing—assumptions that stem from patriarchal beliefs about the role of the mother. Betty Friedan, whose 1963 The Feminine Mystique launched the second wave of feminism in America, repudiated the prevailing psychoanalytic view of anatomy as destiny. Instead of accepting the male-dominated structures that limited women to roles as wives and mothers, she advocated for women to embrace their full humanity by fulfilling their abilities beyond and outside the domestic and familial spheres.
In Chapter 8, Erikson applies his theory of Psychosocial Development and the Mutual Contract to the civil rights movement. All formerly oppressed groups face the task of creating new, positive identities in a society that has tried to dominate them and suppress their opportunities. Erikson lays out both the problems facing African American individuals in forming a new identity, ranging from the danger of losing one’s individual identity in the collective struggle to the task of overcoming a negative identity imposed by the dominant culture to the quest for new historical actualities or certainties that will allow a new identity to form. He finds some hope in technology as a sort of equalizer for the workforce, along with removal of barriers for access to the middle class.
Writing at a time of global decolonization, Erikson considers how political shifts in Africa and Asia would affect identity development—part of his wider exploration of Identity as a Product of Environment. Between 1945 and 1960, three dozen new states in Asia and Africa “achieved autonomy or outright independence” from European colonial rulers (US State Department Office of the Historian, “Decolonization of Asia and Africa,” 1945-1960). As these newly independent nations sought to forge postcolonial national identities, individuals within them reconceptualized their personal identities. These individual and collective processes of identity formation can be viewed as complementary, and Erikson treats the emergence of postcolonial national identity as a metaphor for the process by which individuals from marginalized groups can overcome the negative identities imposed on them by white supremacy and patriarchy.
While the civil rights movement changed government through legislation—not through the formation of a new government, as in postcolonial societies—identity issues for their formerly oppressed citizens were similar. Issues that Erikson discusses in the work of leading Black writers of his day, including Ralph Ellison and James Baldwin, can be found today in the work of postcolonial writers such as Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie (Nigeria) and Tan Twan Eng (Malaysia).
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