Cicero: On Duties (De Officiis)

As in Book I, Cicero continues to examine duty, or appropriate action, but in this book, he discusses actions which pertain to utility, rather than honorableness. Things that are utile "protect human life," and are associated with the private good (90). Some utile things are inanimate (i.e. natural resources), while others are animate (i.e. livestock, human beings, and the gods). Each of these utile things must be interacted with in such a way as to elicit their cooperation in preserving human life. For inanimate objects, this means practices like land cultivation and architecture. For humans, it means gaining the devotion of others to ourselves.

To "entice and arouse the devotion" of others for "our own utility," one should act out of goodwill, honor, or trust-building in fellow man, rather than in a self-serving way (94). These things can be done through justice, one Cicero's four virtues. Justice, Cicero explains, is necessary not only for those in high political office, but in every kind of human interaction, whether farmers or thieves. Just actions will foster respect and esteem, rather than fear. Cicero warns that to rule by fear breeds a hatred of the ruler, as well as a constant fear within the ruler that they may be killed or overthrown at any moment. Inevitably, he argues, in a "free political community," liberty will win out (95).

Appearing to be just is just as important as actually being just. Cicero advises his son to associate with "illustrious and wise men" not only to learn from them, but to seem more like them simply by association (104). He encourages him to take advantage of his youth, which makes one seem honest and blameless. He also advocates for the use of public speaking in fostering one's sense of justice. The courts can be a good forum for this, but he warns his son against speaking as a prosecutor as it "invites a sordid fame" to be known as such. Speaking eloquently in defense, though, is more acceptable (107).

Another way to demonstrate justice is to extol "beneficence and liberality" (107) upon others. Cicero argues that acts of kindness outweigh monetary gestures. These acts of kindness should be dependent upon an individual's circumstance, and are done so that future generations will remember them. Neither monetary gestures nor acts of kindness should be done in attempts at coercion. To this point, Cicero gives the example of Philip II of Macedonia. Phillip II chastised his son, Alexander the Great, for attempting to buy the trust of the Macedonians, rather than earn it through his actions. Cicero distinguishes, though, between prudent largesse (i.e. paying off friends' debts) and wasteful largesse (i.e. giving frequent, lavish feasts), and explains that the former can be useful so as not to seem stingy. He points out the unsustainability of extending largesse then needing to borrow, or seize, resources to replenish what was given.

Cicero claims that not all humans are equally worthy of receiving assistance, monetary or otherwise. He reasons that it is better to help a "poor man" than a "less-than-commendable yet wealthy one," as fortune itself does not make a person great (117). Someone who is truly in need will also come to see the person who helped them as a protector, and will likely be more appreciative of the service.

Lastly, Cicero addresses favors that benefit the commonwealth, rather than individuals. He continues to champion actions that will benefit the greatest number of people and do no harm. For example, civic leaders should take precautions to create a surplus of sustenance-related resources, so that seizure and tax or private property never becomes necessary. No leader should exploit their commonwealth for personal gains, whether material or spiritual.